

Topicalization, Focus-Movement, and Yiddish-Movement: A Pragmatic Differentiation

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Topicalization, Focus-Movement, and Yiddish-Movement:
A Pragmatic Differentiation*
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1. Survey of the literature. Ever since its appearance in Ross 1967, the syntactic construction exemplified in 1 and described in 2 has been the subject of much discussion in the fields of both syntax and discourse:

- (1)a. Beans I don't like. (Ross 1967:168)
b. That book I got from you'll never guess who.
(2) $\left[\begin{array}{cc} [X_1] & [\dots [X_2] \dots] \end{array} \right]$,
S NP S NP
where X_1 and X_2 are coreferential,
 X_2 is a gap/trace, and
 X_1 is nonvocative.

Even in Ross 1967, however, it was noted that this syntactic description holds for what, on intuitive, dialectal, and/or distributional grounds, seem to be different constructions. Thus, for example, Ross distinguishes sentences like 1 from sentences like 3, which he prefixes with a Star of David, meaning grammatical only 'if Yiddish' (p. 267):

- (3)a. ★ Egg creams you want, bananas you'll get. (Ross 1967:267)
b. ★ A finger I wouldn't lift for him!






This distinction is maintained in Hankamer 1971, where sentences like 1a,b are called Topicalizations, while sentences like those of 3 are called Yiddish-Movements. Similarly, Jackendoff 1972 distinguishes between Topicalizations and what he calls 'Yiddish dialect' constructions, and Jerry Morgan has distinguished Yiddish-Movement from 'Goy-Movement'.¹ On the other hand, Gundel 1974 separates 'Topic Topicalizations' like 1a,b from 'Focus Topicalizations' like 4a,b; Chafe (1976:49) likewise notes these two types, calling the first a Topicalization 'with two foci of contrast', the second a Topicalization with a 'single focus of contrast'. More recently, Reinhart (To appear:18) remarks that 'NPs fronted by topicalization...can receive focus intonation.'

- (4)a. A certain monkey I saw. (Gundel 1974:187)
b. Macadamia nuts they're called.



The Boolean sum of these repeated two-way distinctions is a three-way distinction, between what I shall call Topicalization (e.g. 1; henceforth TOP), Focus-Movement (e.g. 4; henceforth FM), and Yiddish-Movement (e.g. 3; henceforth YM).²

2. Motivation for differentiating them. It still remains to be esta-

blished that there is a theoretical motivation for differentiating between these three constructions. Our mere intuition that they are different does not entail a formal distinction. It is true that they differ intonationally, or at least TOP and FM/YM do, as indicated in 5, but that is not an obvious reason to consider them different constructions, any more than the intonational difference between 6a and 6b is a reason to posit two passives:

- (5)a.  Macadamia nuts I can't afford. (TOP)
 b.  Macadamia nuts I think they're called. (FM)
 c.  Macadamia nuts I should buy yet! (YM)
- (6)a.  I was told by him to put it there.
 b.  I was told by him to put it there.

The motivation comes rather from three other factors. First, as noted by Gundel (1974) and Reinhart (To appear), at least two of the constructions differ in discourse function, and I shall present evidence below that all three differ. Second, they differ dialectally: TOP (e.g. 5a) and FM (e.g. 5b) are grammatical for all speakers, while YM (e.g. 5c) as noted by Ross and others, is grammatical only for 'Yiddish dialect' speakers. Third, they differ distributionally; for all speakers, for whom 1b and 4b are grammatical, a reverse of the intonation contours results in ungrammaticality, as in 7:

- (7)a.  (*)That book I got from you'll never guess who.
 b.  (*)Macadamia nuts they're called.

Likewise, 3b, grammatical only for YM speakers, is ungrammatical for all speakers, YM speakers included, when intoned as a TOP sentence, as seen in 8:

- (8)  (*)A finger I wouldn't lift for him.

3. The differentiation. As is clear from 2, the three types cannot be distinguished in terms of their left-to-right grammatical form, at least not obviously. Rather, I shall argue that what they differ by is what kinds of information their various parts represent and what relations these must bear to the preceding discourse. For ease of exposition, let us call the leftmost NP, X_1 , 'the NP', what is left 'the clause', and the proposition that the whole sentence represents 'the proposition'. I shall try to show that each of the three constructions is subject to two sets of constraints, one on

what kind of information the NP represents and another on what kind of relation exists between the proposition and the context. Let us now look more closely at each of the three constructions, beginning with TOP.

3.1.TOP. First, I shall give evidence that, in₃TOP, (i)the NP must be referential, i.e. must represent an entity, (ii)the NP must represent an entity that is already evoked in the discourse or else one that is in a salient set-relation to some entity already evoked or saliently inferrable in the discourse, and (iii)the proposition minus the information represented by the constituent receiving tonic stress must represent old information, the tonically stressed constituent representing new information. The notion of old information will be made more precise below. First, consider:

- (9)a. I didn't think you would leave.
b. I told Mary that I wasn't chosen.
c. I brought some books with me.
- (10)a. You I didn't think \emptyset would leave.
b. Mary I told \emptyset that I wasn't chosen.
c. Some books I brought \emptyset with me.
- (11)a. I didn't think there would be a fight.
b. I resented it that I wasn't chosen.
c. I brought few books with me.
- (12)a.*There I didn't think \emptyset would be a fight.
b.*It I resented \emptyset that I wasn't chosen.
c.*Few books I brought \emptyset with me.

The difference in grammaticality between the sentences of 10 and those of 12 cannot be attributed to any obvious syntactic difference but correlates rather with a semantic difference: the NPs in 10 refer, or 'represent entities', while those of 12 do not. This does not seem coincidental: in the corpus of 56 tokens of TOP in Terkel's (1974) Working, all the leftmost NPs represent entities. This suggests the following preliminary hypothesis:

- (13) Preliminary Hypothesis I: The NP in TOP must represent an entity.

However, it turns out that not all TOPs in which the NP is referential are felicitous, as seen in 14 and 15:

- (14)a. A: You want to see Stardust Memories?
B: I saw Stardust Memories yesterday.
B': Stardust Memories I saw \emptyset yesterday.
- b. A: You see every Woody Allen movie as soon as it comes out.
B: No--I saw Stardust Memories (only) yesterday.
B': No--Stardust Memories I saw \emptyset (only) yesterday.
- (15)a. A: Why are you laughing?
B: I saw Stardust Memories yesterday. It was

very funny.

B': #Stardust Memories I saw \emptyset yesterday. It was very funny.⁴

b. A: Sue told me that you had been away.

B: Yeah. Oh, by the way, I saw Stardust Memories yesterday.

B': #Yeah. Oh, by the way, Stardust Memories I saw \emptyset yesterday.

Although Stardust Memories is referential in all the sentences of 14 and 15, only in the contexts of 14 are the TOP sentences felicitous. One difference between 14 and 15 is that, in the former, the NP represents old information in the discourse, an evoked entity in 14a and an inferrable entity in 14b, whereas, in 15, the NP represents new information in the discourse (an 'unused' entity, following Prince 1979, 1981). This suggests that the hypothesis be revised as follows:

- (16) Preliminary Hypothesis II: The NP in TOP must represent either an entity that is already evoked in the discourse or one that is inferentially related to some evoked entity.

However, consider the following:

- (17)a. I went to his house and I rang the bell.
b. #I went to his house and the bell I rang \emptyset .

- (18)a. That newspaper infuriates me. I think I'll write to the editor.

- b. #That newspaper infuriates me. The editor I think I'll write to \emptyset .

In 17, the bell is inferentially related to his house (Clark and Haviland 1977; Hawkins 1978; Prince 1979, 1981), but TOP in 17b is infelicitous. Likewise, in 18, the editor is inferentially related to that newspaper, but TOP is infelicitous in 18b. Now compare the following naturally-occurring tokens:

- (19)a. 'I have a recurring dream in which...I can't remember what I say. I usually wake up crying. This dream I've had maybe three, four times.'
(Terkel 1974:118)

- b. Q: 'Do all the long-haired guys bug you?'

A: 'I don't want my son to have it. Now, the sideburns I wear because I do TV commercials and stuff. I'm in the modeling field.'⁵ (p. 191)

- (20)a. 'Then I make a schedule of what's to be done during the day. I try to assign as many tasks as possible to my staff, so I can reduce my work. I need two or three additional people.'

A couple who are not pulling their weight I'm in the process of replacing. This is very painful.' (p. 587)

- b. '...these guys knew they were being followed and they still continued the same shit. People like that you have no sympathy for.' (p. 212)

On the basis of data like 17-20, it is necessary to constrain further the notion of 'inferentially related' as follows:

- (21) Hypothesis $r\bar{e}$ NP in TOP: The NP in TOP must represent either an entity that is already evoked in the discourse or else one that is in a salient set-relation to something already in the discourse.

For example, in 19a, we find an entity, this dream, that has been explicitly introduced into the discourse, and, in 19b, an entity, the sideburns, that is taken to be salient in the extratextual context, or what I have elsewhere called 'situationally evoked' (Prince 1981). In 20, on the other hand, a couple who are not pulling their weight represents an element (here subset) of an already evoked set, my staff. In 20b, people like that represents a set of which these guys represents an element (also subset). Set-element inferences like that in 20a are far more common than element-set inferences like that in 20b, but both do occur.

Now consider the following:


- (22)a. '[I graduated from high school as] an average student. My initiative didn't carry me any further than average. History I found to be dry. Math courses I was never good at. I enjoyed sciences...Football was my bag.' (p. 590)
- b. 'Sunday I was taking paper and pasting it together and finding a method of how to drop spoons, a fork, a napkin, and a straw into one package. The napkin feeder I got. The straw feeder we made already. That leaves us the spoon and the fork.' (p. 516)

Note that the underlined NP in 22a, history, is not evoked and is not in a set-element or element-set relation to any already evoked entity. However, it is inferrable, via a set-element inference, from a set that is not mentioned but that is itself saliently inferable from the high school 'frame'. Put differently, if a hearer did not know that associated with high school is a set of courses or subjects and that history (and then math courses, etc.) represents an element of that set, then, I claim, s/he could not process this text effectively. Likewise, in 22b, upon hearing the napkin feeder, a hearer must infer a set of parts of the device that the speaker is planning to construct and must infer that the napkin feeder (and then the straw feeder) is an element of that set. Thus,


examples like those in 22 are accounted for by the Hypothesis, their peculiarity being that the relevant set is not explicitly evoked but must be saliently inferrable from the prior context.

Now consider a still more complex case, ostensibly where an element-to-element inference is at work:


- (23)a. 'Most of the time I make biscuits for my kids. Cornbread you got to make. I don't mean the canned kind.' (p. 165)
 b. 'A barber, he has to talk about everything-- baseball, football, basketball, anything that comes along. Religion and politics most barbers stay away from. Very few barbers that don't know about sports.' (p. 315)
 c. 'I can't really hate the colored fellow that's working with me all day. The black intellectual I got no respect for. The white intellectual I got no use for. I got no use for the black militant who's going to scream 300 years of slavery to me while I'm busting my ass.' (p. 6)
- (24)a.



b.



b'.



Obviously, to infer one element from another element is in effect to infer a set of which both are elements, and that is exactly what seems to be going on in cases like 23. That is, upon hearing cornbread in 23a, the hearer 'looks back', finds biscuits, and infers

the appropriate set of which both cornbread and biscuits are elements, as illustrated in 24a. In 23b, the situation is somewhat less clear: at first blush, one might think that religion and politics are elements of the set evoked by everything, as illustrated in 24b. Under that analysis, however, the speaker would be overtly contradicting himself--barbers have to talk about everything, which includes two things they do not talk about. In another analysis, illustrated in 24b', religion and politics lie outside the set or scope of everything, and a new set, 'everything everything', is inferred, which includes one subset of things one has to talk about, and another which one avoids. The last sentence in 23b is perhaps significant: the speaker seems to be telling us explicitly that the 'everything' mentioned earlier is in fact the set of sports. In 23c, the situation is fairly complex: upon hearing the black intellectual, the hearer 'looks back', finds the colored fellow that's working with me all day, and infers a set of which each is an element, presumably the set of blacks. Next, upon hearing the white intellectual, the hearer 'looks back' again, is unable to use 'blacks', finds the white intellectual, and infers a new set of which each is an element, presumably the set of intellectuals. Note that the speaker continues on the subject of blacks, leaving the interval about intellectuals as a parenthetical, as illustrated in 24c.⁶

Sentences like those of 22 and 23 all have two features in common. First, at least according to the analysis presented here, they involve co-elements of a set, and, second, they all have the flavor of a list. (In 23c, there are two lists.) The first feature, I claim, is prerequisite to the second: to understand items as belonging to a list, one must infer that they are co-elements of some single, independently namable, set.⁷ Consider 25:

- (25)a. I saw Jimmy yesterday and I sent regards to Miss Lillian.
- b. Jimmy I saw yesterday and Miss Lillian I sent regards to.

In 25a, the hearer is assumed to be familiar with both Jimmy and Miss Lillian and, therefore, to know that there exists a special relation between them (son-mother). The same is of course true for 25b, but here there is an additional relation: Jimmy and Miss Lillian are also co-elements of some set, perhaps the set of people that the speaker was to get in touch with. Admittedly, these are rather subtle intuitions; perhaps 26 is a bit clearer:

- (26)a. I used to live in Philadelphia and I often went to Atlantic City.
- b. Philadelphia I used to live in and Atlantic City I often went to.

In 26a, it is easy (for someone who is familiar with the area) to take the sentence as an asymmetric coordination (Schmerling 1975), i.e. to understand the first clause, I used to live in Philadelphia,

as the setting for the whole sentence, i.e. while living in Philadelphia, the speaker often went to Atlantic City. This understanding does not seem to be available for 26b; rather, we find a symmetric coordination, a listing of the speaker's relation to two (Eastern) cities. This, I claim, is forced by the TOP construction which requires us to construe Philadelphia and Atlantic City as co-elements of a single set and, since more than one element is evoked, induces a list understanding.

Now, if we consider the examples in 22 again, we see that, in addition to being lists, they also exemplify the phenomenon of contrast, claimed by Chafe (1976) to be the function of TOP. Contrast, it turns out, is not a necessary effect of TOP, as seen in, for example, 19a, but rather obtains just in case (i) a list understanding is induced, and (ii) a salient opposition is inferred in the new⁸ information represented in the clause associated with each element. Contrast is clearly not inferred, therefore, in cases like 19a, where the NP represents simply an evoked entity and not an element of a stated or saliently inferable set.

Let us now turn to the second set of constraints on TOP, those concerning the relation between the proposition and the context. Consider first the case where the NP represents an already evoked entity, e.g. 19. The propositions conveyed by 19a,b are presented in 27a,b, respectively:

- (27)a. I've had this dream maybe three, four times.
- b. I wear the sideburns because I do TV commercials and stuff.

In both cases, it turns out that, if one constituent is replaced by a variable, the resulting open sentence is already known in the discourse:

- (28)a. I've had this dream X/some number of times.
- b. I wear the sideburns for X/some reason.

That is, in 19a, since we have just been told that the speaker has had a recurring dream, we know that she has had this dream some number of times. Likewise, in 19b, since it is salient in the extra-textual context that the speaker wears sideburns, and, since the wearing of sideburns is assumed to be an intentional, controllable act, we know that he wears them for some reason. The new information in 19a,b, then, is not a proposition but the value of some variable in an already known proposition. Note further that the constituent representing this new information is just the one that receives tonic stress. This suggests the following preliminary hypothesis:

- (29) Preliminary Hypothesis III: The open sentence resulting from the replacement of the tonically stressed constituent in the proposition by a variable represents old information.

But now consider the situation where the NP represents an entity that is in a salient set-relation to something already known or saliently inferrable, e.g. 22b. It cannot be the case that it is already known that the speaker is in some state with respect to the napkin feeder, which is what 29 would predict, since the average hearer has never even heard of a napkin feeder. What is presumed to be known is that the speaker is in some state with respect to whatever goes into making the desired device. Thus it seems that the hypothesis must be modified for set-element cases:

- (30) Preliminary Hypothesis IV: First, if the NP represents an element of a set, replace it in the proposition by that set, yielding a new proposition. Then, in all cases, the open sentence resulting from the replacement of the tonically stressed constituent in the (new) proposition by a variable represents old information.

Thus, in 22b, upon hearing the first TOP sentence, the hearer must consider as known not 31a but 31b:

- (31)a. I am in some state with respect to the napkin feeder.
b. I am in some state with respect to the set of things that will make up the device.

Note that the same open sentence, 32b, will be needed for the TOP sentence immediately following, The straw feeder we made already, as well as for the non-TOP final sentence, That leaves the spoon and the fork.⁹

But now consider 32 and 33:

- (32) A: What do you take on hotdogs?
B: I eat hotdogs with mustard.
B': Hotdogs I eat with mustard.
(33) A: I hear you eat lots of hotdogs.
B: Yeah. I eat hotdogs with mustard. I think it's the mustard I really like.
B': #Yeah. Hotdogs I eat with mustard. I think it's the mustard I really like.

In both 32B' and 33B', the NP, hotdogs, represents an evoked entity. In both cases, assuming mustard is tonically stressed, the open sentence is 34a or 34b, depending on whether the constituent filling the open sentence is an NP or a PP, respectively:

- (34)a. I eat hotdogs with X/something.
b. I eat hotdogs Xly/in some way.

In both cases, the open sentence represents generally known or

plausibly inferable information.¹⁰ However, 32B' is more felicitous than 33B'. The difference seems to be that, in 32B', the open sentence represents not just generally known or plausibly inferable information but information that is taken to be salient/given, i.e. assumed to be in the hearer's consciousness (Chafe 1974, 1976), at the time of hearing the utterance, whereas, in 33B', the information, though plausibly inferable, is not salient/given. Thus, 30 must be revised as follows:

- (35) Hypothesis $r\bar{e}$ Proposition in TOP: First, if the NP represents an element of a set, replace it in the proposition by that set, yielding a new proposition. Then, in all cases, the open sentence resulting from the replacement of the tonically stressed constituent in the (new) proposition by a variable represents salient/given information.

Space does not permit a full discussion, but it should be mentioned that these phenomena are nicely handled by a modified version of Wilson and Sperber's (1979) model of ordered entailments. That model was intended to account for presupposition but in fact is applicable only to those presuppositional phenomena that correlate with marked syntactic constructions, e.g. it-clefts, or with marked stress; it does not, as Wilson and Sperber realize, relate to other presuppositional phenomena, e.g. existential presupposition correlating with definiteness. The necessary modification of their model is that the appropriate variable cannot be determined purely on the basis of syntax, as they have claimed, but is sensitive to semantic information. Thus, in 23c, the first TOP, repeated in 36a, requires not simply 36b to be treated as given/salient (Wilson and Sperber's first background entailment) but rather 36c:

- (36)a. The black intellectual I got no respect for.
 b. I am in a state with respect to blacks.
 c. I $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{am in an attitudinal state with respect to} \\ \text{have opinions about} \end{array} \right\}$ blacks.

Of course, even 36b is semantically-based: English has no true pro-verb; some verbs ('statives') must be replaced by something like be in a state with respect to, while others ('actives') must be replaced by something like do something to, and the basis for choosing one or the other is semantic and not syntactic.

There remains much to be said about TOP, but I shall now turn to Focus-Movement.

3.2.FM. Consider the FM sentences in 37:

- (37)a. 'With Sabre being so valuable, you were allowed no more than three minutes on the telephone. You had twenty seconds, busy-out time it was called, to put the information into Sabre.' (p. 83)

- b. 'Now they're coming out with a hydraulic crane. Cherry pickers they're called. They're so very easy to upset...' (p. 50)
- c. 'You usually didn't get much rest on Sunday, had to cook for ten children on Sunday. I've raised ten and I had eleven. Three meals a day I cooked on Sunday. I got so I couldn't cook like I used to.' (p. 40)
- d. 'This is a student who went here two years. [silently but visibly counting blocks of courses on transcript] FIVE semesters she was here.' (KLM, 3/21/80)

In contrast to the situation in TOP, here the NPs, or rather the stressed constituent within the NPs, represent not entities but rather attributes, or, more precisely, values of attributes: in 37a, b, names for entities, or, put differently, the values of the attribute be called X, and, in 37c, d, the cardinality of a known set, or, put differently, the values of the attributes cook n meals a day on Sunday, be here n semesters. The clause in a FM sentence appears to be equally and relatedly constrained: it represents some entity and some attribute (taken together with the unstressed constituent of the NP, if any).¹¹ But consider 38:

- (38)a. They just bought a dog. FIDO they named it.
- b. #They just bought a dog. FIDO they wouldn't name it.

From data like 37 and 38, it appears that the fact that the entity in question has the attribute in question must be either explicitly stated in the discourse, as in 37c, d, or else must be saliently inferrable from what is in the discourse, e.g. 37a, b, akin to the situation in TOP. For example, if one hears that some individuals have bought a dog, it is not only plausible but also salient/given, i.e. appropriately in the hearer's consciousness, that they named it something. In contrast, while it may be plausible/inferrable that they wouldn't name it something, it is certainly not salient. Thus, upon hearing 39, one may unexceptionally ask 40a but hardly 40b:

- (39) They just bought a dog.
- (40)a. What did they name it?
- b. #What wouldn't they name it?

Thus the following hypothesis is suggested:

- (41) Hypothesis $r\bar{e}$ FM: The (tonically stressed constituent within the) NP represents the value of an attribute and it is new in the discourse. The open sentence resulting from the replacement of that constituent by a variable conveys the information that some entity has some attribute and it represents salient/given information in the discourse.

3.3.YM. Turning now to Yiddish-Movement, consider 42:

- (42)a. 'She works with me. Twenty years we've been here almost. They demand more from a hairstylist and you get more money for your work.' (p. 317)
- b. EFP: 'What did she see in him?' [him = the Scarsdale diet doctor]
- FCC: 'Eleven million! ELEVEN MILLION he made, on the Scarsdale diet!' (3/13/80)
- c. 'Could not maintain an erection in the Promised Land! At least not when I needed it, not when there was something more desirable than my own hand to stick it into. But,...you can't stick tapioca pudding into anything. Tapioca pudding I am offering this girl! Wet sponge cake!' (Roth 1967:291)

From data like 42, it appears that YM is similar to FM but operates over a wider domain: what is represented by the NP may be other than the value of an attribute (e.g. an entity), it may be already given in the discourse and simply repeated for rhetorical effect (e.g. 42b,c), and the proposition resulting from the replacement of the NP by a variable need not represent salient/given information. For example, it is not salient/given, in 42a, that the speaker has been in the same location for almost n years. Note that, without almost, 42a would qualify as an instance of FM, the open sentence being We've been here n years, which is salient/given here.¹²

Even YM, however, is not entirely unconstrained; consider:

- (43)a. Q: How's your son?
A: Don't ask! A sportscar he wants!
- b. Q: How's your son?
A: #Don't ask! A sportscar he stole!

In 43a, YM is felicitous when it can be assumed to be general shared knowledge, but not necessarily salient/given, that a son, or at least this son, wants things, which happens to be a truism in the general YM-speaking population. The YM in 43b, in contrast, would be felicitous only if it were assumed to be general shared knowledge that a son, or at least this son, steals things. Thus, the following hypothesis is suggested:

- (44) Hypothesis $r\bar{e}$ YM: The NP, which receives tonic stress, represents new or, in the case of rhetorical redundancy, given information. The open sentence resulting from the replacement of the NP in the proposition by a variable represents minimally generally known/plausible information.

4.Summary. In conclusion, then, TOP, FM, and YM all crucially involve the marking of old/new information: TOP picks up on some

evoked or set-inferable entity that figures in an open sentence representing given/salient information and closes that open sentence with some new information. FM adds or changes the value of some attribute which closes an open sentence, the open sentence conveying the information that some entity has that attribute and representing given/salient information. YM, more like FM than like TOP, differs in being relatively unconstrained with respect to what can be focal and what kind of 'oldness' is required of the open sentence. Further, TOP differs from both FM and YM in that it places new information after old information, the usual order in English, whereas FM and YM place new information before old information. All three have characteristic intonation contours. A more detailed account is presented in 45:

(45) Inferencing Convention for OSV Constructions:

I. TOP:

- Upon hearing an OSV construction have a Fall-Fall intonation contour, where NP_i is in leftmost position, infer that NP_i represents some entity E_i and that the entire proposition P_i minus the tonically stressed constituent C represents an open sentence P_i . Then,
- Search the context for some stated or inferable E_i . If it is there, infer that P_i is given/salient and fill in the new information represented by C . If not,
 - Search the context for some relevant stated or inferable E_j , where $i \neq j$, representing a set. If it is there, infer that E_j is an element (member or subset) of E_i . Form a new open sentence P_k by replacing E_i by E_j in P_i and infer that P_k is given/salient. Add the new information represented by C . If not,
 - Search the context for some relevant stated or inferable E_k , where $k \neq i$, representing an individual. If it is there, infer that E_k is an element of E_i and that P_i is given/salient. Add the new information represented by C . If not,
 - Search the context for some relevant stated or inferable E_l , where $l \neq i$, and infer E_m , such that E_l, E_m are co-elements of E_i . Form a new open sentence P_l by replacing E_i by E_m in P_i and infer that P_l is given/salient. Add the new information represented by C . (Note that E_m can later serve as E_j , in which case P_l should be identical with P_k .)

II. FM:

Upon hearing an OSV construction with a Fall intonation contour, representing proposition P_i , with NP_i in leftmost position, infer that the (tonically stressed constituent within) NP_i represents the value V of some attribute, A . P_i minus V represents an open sentence P_i , where P_i represents the information that some entity has A and where P_i is given/salient. Add or replace the value of A represented by V .

III. YM:

Upon hearing an OSV construction with an emphatic Fall intonation contour (and accompanied by a dorsal display of the speaker's raised right hand¹³), representing P_i , with NP_i in leftmost position, infer that NP_i represents some E_i or V and that P_i minus E_i/V represents an open sentence P_i , where P_i is generally known or plausibly inferable. Add or replace or simply reflect with affect on the information represented by E_i/V .

Notes

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1. This is a personal communication from Georgia Green. I have been unable to locate any written reference.

2. These names are chosen simply for convenience and should not be understood as conveying that the constructions have anything to do with either topichood or movement.

3. The term referential is used here in the sense of 'evoking an entity', not in the sense in which it is used in Donnellan 1966, where it is opposed to attributive. Both Donnellan's referential and attributive descriptions are referential here. See Webber 1979:2-12ff. for discussion.

4. The symbol # is used to indicate 'infelicitous discourse'.

5. Simple page numbers following examples henceforth indicate Terkel 1974.

6. The question of how one chooses the appropriate set is a most complex one; for example, the black intellectual and the white intellectual are co-elements of many sets, e.g. humans, literates, vertebrates, animates. Intuitively, in this case, it would seem that the most immediate set (in one's knowledge-store) of which both are elements is chosen. However, consider the following:

- (i) I'll tell you what I think. Robert Redford I like, Paul Newman I could watch forever, and Steve McQueen was fantastic, but the rest are all lousy.

To know who the rest are, one must know which set is to be inferred. If it is the set of blond actors, then the speaker has not asserted, for example, that Robert De Niro is lousy, or Liv Ullman; if it is the set of actors, then he has said something about De Niro but not about Ullmann; if it is the set of acting individuals then he has said something about both. Obviously, the key issues here are relevance and the structure of human knowledge, two domains about which little is known.

7. The set must be independently namable to avoid the trivial case

where, for any [a], [b], [c], one infers the set {a,b,c}.

8. What constitutes a 'salient opposition', of course, depends on intentions and on the matter of relevance and cannot be determined on textual grounds. For example, 26b is contrastive if the difference between living somewhere and going there often is relevant; on the other hand, if the difference is not relevant, 26b is not contrastive. Imagine, in the first case, that A has just said to B:

- i. Did you ever get to Philadelphia when you were living in Atlantic City?

If B then responds correctively with 26b, it will be contrastive. On the other hand, suppose that A says:

- ii. I'll give you \$10 for every Eastern city that you're really familiar with.

If B then responds with 26b, there is no contrast: no salient opposition is intended between living in a city and going to one often, each being simply evidence of real familiarity with the place.

9. When more than two co-elements are enumerated, it is quite common for those after the first two to appear in a non-TOP sentence, e.g. 22a, 23c. One also finds lists of two where the first is non-TOP and the second is TOP, e.g. 23a, 23b. What we have not found, however, is TOP--non-TOP--TOP, where only one set/list is intended.

10. One may argue that 34a cannot be known, since the speaker may put nothing on his hotdogs. However, nothing is also something: I eat hotdogs with nothing or I eat hotdogs plain are fine as answers to 32A. See Wilson and Sperber 1979 for a discussion.

11. Note, in 37d, the only new information is five, although the NP is five semesters. If English had no syntactic constraints like Ross' (1967) Left-Branch Constraint, we would predict that 37d would be:

- (i) Five she was here semesters.

It is the case, however, that, although the whole NP is in leftmost position, only the subconstituent representing new information receives tonic stress. (Here and elsewhere where the data were collected orally, stress is indicated with capitals.)

12. The speaker of 42a happens to mention later in the passage that he is Jewish.

13. I thank Bonnie Webber for calling this fact to my attention.

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